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EVIDENCE
I. MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
In three 1976 cases, State v. Brown,' State v. Chandler,2 and
State v. Williams, 3 the supreme court reiterated the South Caro-
lin rule that is used to determine whether a motion for acquittal
in a criminal case should be granted or denied when that motion
is based upon a claim that there is an insufficiency of incriminat-
ing evidence. The key issue in ruling on such a motion is whether
the state has produced sufficient evidence of the accused's guilt
to warrant submitting the case to the jury. In State v. Williams4
the court expressed this well-settled South Carolina rule as fol-
lows:
When a motion for a directed verdict is made, the trial judge is
concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not
with its weight, and although he should not refuse to grant the
motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the
accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit the case to the jury if
there is evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which reasona-
bly tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which guilt
may be fairly and logically deduced.'
In State v. Chandler,I the defendant had been convicted of
common law murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
circumstantial evidence on which he was convicted was insuffi-
cient to submit his case to the jury and, therefore, that the trial
judge had committed error by denying his motion for acquittal.
The supreme court affirmed the defendant's conviction, deter-
mining that the trial judge had not erred in denying the motion
for acquittal. In so finding, the court narrowly defined its scope
of review of the sufficiency of the state's evidence and the denial
of the motion for acquittal: "[O]ur review of the evidence is
1. 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976).
2. 267 S.C. 138, 226 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
3. 266 S.C. 325, 223 S.E.2d 38 (1976).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 333-34, 223 S.E.2d at 42 (citing State v. Wheeler, 259 S.C. 571, 193 S.E.2d
515 (1972); State v. Jordan, 255 S.C. 86, 177 S.E.2d 464 (1970)). Accord, State v. Green,
- S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 618 (1976); State v. Brown, 267 S.C. 311,227 S.E.2d 674 (1976);
State v. Chandler, 267 S.C. 138, 226 S.E.2d 553 (1976); State v. Pauling, 264 S.C. 275,
214 S.E.2d 326 (1975); State v. Matarazzo, 262 S.C. 662, 207 S.E.2d 93 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
6. 267 S.C. 138, 226 S.E.2d 553 (1976).
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limited to whether it is susceptible of a reasonable inference that
could have convinced a jury, properly charged on the burden of
proof and the law relative to circumstantial evidence, that appel-
lant was the murderer."' Furthermore, the court noted the ac-
cepted rule that in determining whether a trial judge has erred
in refusing to grant a motion for acquittal, the appellate court is
required to "view the testimony in the light most favorable to the
State."'
In State v. Brown,9 the defendant had been convicted of
simple possession of marijuana and possession with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana. At the close of the state's case and again at
the close of the evidence, the defense had made a motion for
acquittal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented
by the prosecution. Both motions were denied. On appeal, the
supreme court applied the same test for evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence as had been applied in numerous prior cases.'0
The court reversed Brown's conviction, finding that since the
prosecution had offered no evidence on which the jury could find
that Brown had possessed" the marijuana, it had failed to submit
sufficient evidence to make a jury issue of the defendant's domin-
ion and control of the marijuana, an essential element of both
crimes.
Simply stated, the present rule in South Carolina appears to
be that as long as the state produces any competent evidence
from which a reasonable juror could justifiably conclude that an
accused is guilty, then a motion for acquittal should be denied.'2
The trial judge should only be concerned with the question of
whether or not there exists evidence to support a jury's finding
7. Id. at 140, 226 S.E.2d at 554.
8. Id. (quoting State v. Wheeler, 259 S.C. 571, 578, 193 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1972)); State
v. Brown, 267 S.C. at 316, 227 S.E.2d at 677. Accord, State v. Williams, 266 S.C. at 331,
223 S.E.2d at 41; State v. Wharton, 263 S.C. 437, 442, 221 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1975).
9. 267 S.C. 311, 227 S.E.2d 674 (1976).
10. See cases at note 5 supra and accompanying text.
11. State v. Brown, 267 S.C. at 315, 227 S.E.2d at 676. The court expressed the
controlling law in South Carolina on the issue of what constitutes possession of marijuana:
"'[P]roof of possession requires more than proof of mere presence,' and 'the state must
show defendant had dominion and control over the thing allegedly possessed or had the
right to exercise dominion and control over it.'" Id. at 316, 227 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting
State v. Tabory, 260 S.C. 355, 364, 196 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1973)).
12. See State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955); State v. Brown, 205
S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825 (1945); State v. Rush, 129 S.C. 43, 123 S.E. 765 (1924); State v.
Roddy, 126 S.C. 499, 120 S.E. 359 (1923).
1977]
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of guilt;'3 however, if the prosecution's evidence merely raises a
suspicion as to the accused's guilt, then the motion for acquittal
must be granted."
This standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence
in ruling on a motion for acquittal is less'5 than, (or is at most,
equal to) the standard applied in ruling on a nonsuit in a civil
case. This is disturbing when one considers that an accused has
much more at stake in a criminal case than does a defendant in
a civil action. Whereas the civil defendant may suffer a pecuniary
loss, the criminally accused may suffer a loss of life or liberty, as
well as a financial loss. In any event, the accused becomes irre-
parably stigmatized by the criminal justice system. In view of
these potential penalties, one would expect South Carolina to
have adopted a stricter test of evaluating the evidence on motions
for acquittal.
The rule which guides the trial court judge in determining
whether he should grant or deny a motion for acquittal is essen-
tially based on the traditional concept that the judge and jury
should play distinct roles in the setting of a trial. 7 The judge
should only be concerned with the existence or nonexistence of
evidence; the jury should be concerned with the weight of the
evidence. Accordingly, the rule serves to maintain the separate
provinces of judge and jury by assigning different duties to each
in dealing with evidence submitted at trial.
It is the judge's duty to make the initial determination as to
whether the state has produced sufficient evidence to submit the
case to the jury.'8 If the motion for acquittal is granted, the judge
13. See cases at note 5 supra and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Davis v. Upton, 250 S.C. 288, 290, 157 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1967), where
the court held that "[a] dismissal or nonsuit is proper when a plaintiff's evidence does
not warrant a verdict in his favor."
Since the usual civil case requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, then it
follows that a nonsuit is proper when a plaintiff has failed to offer sufficient evidence to
convince a reasonable juror by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant should
be found liable. Thus the burden of production imposed on the plaintiff in a civil suit to
avoid a nonsuit is greater than the burden imposed on the state to avoid a motion for
acquittal. See also note 43 infra.
16. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Weiland, 267 S.C. 12, 16, 225 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1976), where
the court stated: "It is elementary that in ruling on a motion for a nonsuit, the court must
consider plaintiff's evidence in the light most favorable to her and unless the evidence
gives rise to more than conjecture or speculation, the motion must be granted."
17. See State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. at 328-29, 89 S.E.2d at 926.
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has indicated that the state has failed to satisfy its burden of
production; if the motion is denied, the state has apparently car-
ried its burden. When the judge denies the motion, then the
question of guilt or innocence will be ultimately determined by
the jury. 9 The jury, acting in accordance with the judge's instruc-
tions of law, must weigh the evidence, determine the credibility
of testimony, make decisions of fact, and finally return a verdict.
There are two distinct tests to be applied when evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence.20 Which test is to be applied de-
pends on whether one is referring to the burden of producing
evidence or to the burden of persuasion. "[T]here is one test by
which. . . evidence is to be measured by the jury in its delibera-
tions, and quite another by which it is to be measured by the trial
judge in his consideration of the accused's motion for a directed
verdict." 21As to the test to be applied by the jury in considering
the evidence, "it is necessary that every circumstance relied upon
by the State be proven beyond a reasonable doubt .... "22 As to
the test to be applied by the judge on a motion for acquittal, "the
trial judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of
evidence, not with its weight. . ." and "it is his duty to submit
the case to the jury if there be any substantial evidence which
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused . '...,,23
The limitations on the trial judge in ruling on a motion for
acquittal further the supreme court's desire to maintain the dis-
tinct functions of judge and jury. However, by restricting the trial
judge to determining merely whether there exists or does not exist
evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find the accused
guilty, some confusing problems and anomalous situations have
been created. Some of these problems include: (1) A confusing
situation in which the trial judge must determine whether the
state's evidence produces more than a suspicion of guilt; yet, he
is not permitted to weigh the evidence; 24 (2) an unreasonably
restrictive view of the trial judge's role in ruling on a motion for
acquittal; 25 (3) an illogical relation between the burden of produc-




23. Id. at 329, 89 S.E.2d at 926 (citing State v. Brown, 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825
(1945)).
24. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. See also text accompanying note 28
infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 29-31 infra.
1977l
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ing evidence and the burden of persuasion; 26 and (4) an emascula-
tion of the presumption of innocence and the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. 7
There is an inherent inconsistency in the supreme court's
rule regarding the trial judge's consideration of the evidence when
ruling on a motion for acquittal. On one hand, a trial judge should
be concerned only with the existence or nonexistence of evidence,
and not with the weight of such evidence. On the other hand, the
motion must be denied where the evidence merely raises a suspi-
cion that the accused is guilty.2 There is simply no feasible way
that a trial judge could ascertain whether the evidence merely
raises a suspicion of guilt, without his also considering the weight
of such evidence. To make such determination, he must also con-
sider, at least minimally, the convincing power and credibility of
the evidence. A determination of one necessarily involves the
other.
The court has adopted an unreasonably restrictive view of
the trial court judge's role in evaluating evidence upon a motion
for acquittal. He should be afforded more discretion in determin-
ing the sufficiency of the state's evidence, because it is he who has
the duty of deciding whether a party has satisfied its burden of
producing evidence." Furthermore, by limiting his determination
to the existence or nonexistence of evidence, his effort to screen
out the bad cases is seriously hampered.2 0 If the state's evidence
were of such a poor persuasive quality, that based upon such
evidence no reasonable juror could find the accused guilty beyond
26. See text accompanying notes 32-38 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 39-46 infra.
28. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
29. Professor James has noted:
Since it is the judge who passes upon such motions [motions for acquittal], it
is the judge who determines questions of the sufficiency of evidence and who
allocates the production burden on each issue. Thus these concepts may be
viewed as part of the apparatus for controlling the jury. The court screens all
cases initially to see whether they will even go to the jury.
James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. Rav. 51, 56 (1961).
30. One commentator has stressed that it is essential that a trial judge assume a
broader role in passing on a motion for acquittal:
Assertion of that power [the power to keep cases from the jury], with its insist-
ence upon a "fact" role for court as well as jury, serves not only to minimize
"convicting the innocent" but also to keep the pressure on judge, prosecutor and
police to act as responsibly as possible in screening out cases not fit for trial.
Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
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a reasonable doubt, then there is no justifiable reason that a
motion for acquittal should be denied. The judge is fully capable
of making such an initial determination, and he should be per-
mitted to do so.
If a judge withholds a case from a jury because, based upon
the evidence produced, no reasonable juror could find the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there still exist separate roles
and respective duties for judge and jury. In such a case, the judge
neither transgresses his traditional duty to rule on the production
of evidence nor encroaches on the jury's duty to evaluate the
evidence. "The judge's function is exhausted when he determines
that the evidence does or does not permit the conclusion of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt within the fair operation of a reasona-
ble mind. '' 3' It follows that South Carolina should readily grant
the trial judge additional discretion in evaluating the state's evi-
dence when ruling on a motion of acquittal.
When a judge determines the sufficiency of the evidence in
ruling on a motion for acquittal, he is, in effect, ruling on the
burden of producing evidence. 2 Under South Carolina law this
burden is satisfied when the state has submitted any competent
evidence from which the accused's guilt can be inferred. 3 In con-
trast, the burden of persuading the jury is satisfied when "every
circumstance relied upon by the State [is] proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. ' 34 The great difference between the two stan-
dards, the standard of production and the standard of persuasion,
is illogical. The South Carolina rule on motions for acquittal fails
to recognize that the "'duty of bringing forward evidence' is not
so very different from [the] 'burden of persuasion,' ,,31 and that
31. Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837
(1947). In Curley the court succinctly stated that the judge's function is "to deny the jury
any opportunity to operate beyond its province." Id. at 232. Furthermore, "[i]f the
evidence is such that reasonable jurymen must necessarily have such a doubt, the judge
must require acquittal, because no other result is permissible within the fixed bounds of
jury consideration." Id. See also Judge Frank's strong concurring opinion in United States
v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956), where he maintained
that the Curley test does not require the judge to find that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt before he can submit the case to the jury; he must only be able to
conclude that reasonable minds could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 286.
32. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
33. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
34. 228 S.C. at 328, 89 S.E.2d at 926.
35. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Per-
suasion, 68 HARV. L. Rv. 1382, 1382 (1955) [hereinafter cited as McNaughton]. For a
detailed analysis of the distinction between the burden of production and the burden of
1977]
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"the duty of bringing forward evidence, or burden of production
of evidence, is a derivative function of the burden of persuasion
of a jury."3 It is derivative because "[p]ersuasion-or belief, or
probability-is the basic ingredient of both . . . . ",31 Therefore,
the burden of production should be commensurate with the bur-
den of persuasion.
If a jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
an accused is guilty, then it is only logical to require that the
evidence, upon which such guilt must be based, be sufficient to
support such a finding. Accordingly, a motion for acquittal
should be granted if no reasonable juror could find the accused
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence of the
case. 8 South Carolina should adopt such a rule to apply to mo-
tions for acquittal, and thereby incorporate the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard into the burden of producing evi-
dence.
The motion for acquittal, when applied with a beyond a rea-
sonable doubt standard, serves to safeguard an accused's due
process rights. Under the present South Carolina rule, there is no
viable means of judicial evaluation of the application of the rea-
sonable doubt standard by the jury. The judge is denied the op-
portunity to prevent the jury from operating beyond its province,
for he does not have any efficient means to prevent the jury from
reaching a verdict that is clearly based on conjecture, specula-
tion, passion or prejudice. 3 The use of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard would grant a trial judge a pre-verdict or post-verdict check
persuasion, see J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 355-
64 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485 & 2487 (3d ed. 1940); James, Burdens of Proof,
47 VA. L. REV. 51 (1961).
36. McNaughton at 1382.
37. Id. at 1390-91.
38. In Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d at 232-33, Judge Prettyman delivered a
classic statement of the rule which should be applied in ruling on a motion for acquittal:
The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing upon a motion for
directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon the evidence, giving
full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence,
and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there
must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; or, to
state it another way, if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might
fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted.
39. See United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., concurring); Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d at 232. Comment, Criminal Proce-
dure-Use of Reasonable Doubt Standard in Ruling on a Motion for Judgment of
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on a jury decision that could otherwise be based on insufficient
evidence. The stricter standard serves not only to minimize con-
victing the innocent, but also acts to screen out cases not fit for
trial.4 0
The fact that the South Carolina rule does not incorporate
the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in considering
motions for acquittal suggests a restriction of an accused's consti-
tutionally protected due process rights. In In re Winship,4 the
United States Supreme Court held: "Lest there remain any doubt
about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof of every fact neces-
sary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 42 If the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not considered when rul-
ing on a motion of acquittal, as well as when determining the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence, then the due process rights
protected by the standard become terribly diluted. Furthermore,
the policies upon which the stricter standard of proof is based
become meaningless.
The judge's charge to the jury that an accused may be found
guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt should not
absolve the court from taking an additional precaution to ascer-
tain that the evidence upon which the accused is tried is in fact
sufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the reasonable doubt standard is not used in considering
a motion for acquittal, then it is highly possible that an accused
40. See note 30 supra.
41. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
42. Id. at 364. The Supreme Court found that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard should apply to the jury's final determination of the accused's guilt or innocence.
It did not specifically address the question whether the same standard should be applied
by a judge in ruling on a motion for acquittal. However, it is reasonable to assume that
the Court would have so found if the question had been raised, because the Court expressly
sought to minimize factual errors in a criminal trial to protect the accused's presumption
of innocence: "The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme
of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting
on factual error." Id. at 363.
Thus, it would also be desirable to reduce the risk of convictions resting on factual
error before the case is even submitted to the jury, at the motion for acquittal stage of
the trial. In another United States Supreme Court case, the Court determined that "the
verdict in a criminal case is sustained only when there is 'relevant evidence from which
the jury could properly find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt,' that the accused is
guilty." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 n.4 (1946) (quoting
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944)).
1977]
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may be found guilty upon evidence that would not even be suffi-
cient to prove that the accused was guilty by a preponderance of
the evidence. 3 If an accused were found guilty based upon such
weak and unsupportive evidence, then the entire criminal justice
system would be disparaged."
The fact that an accused is presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty, and that this presumption continues throughout
the course of a criminal trial, should guide South Carolina in
fashioning a more satisfactory test to apply to motions for acquit-
tal.4"
To conclude:
The motion for acquittal is of utmost importance in a crimi-
nal case. It should operate as a screening device to prevent the
accused's case from going to the jury when the prosecution has
fdiled to introduce evidence of a certain quantum from which
the jury can find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This
power to keep the case from the jury serves (1) to protect the
innocent, (2) to keep the pressure on the judge, prosecutor and
police to perform their duties in screening out cases not fit for
trial, and (3) to maintain the criminal sanction as one of a
serious nature which requires higher standards of proof than a
civil action.46
43. "[A] person accused of a crime ... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disad-
vantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and
imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case."
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (citing the dissent at lower court, Samuel W. v. Family
Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 205, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (1969)).
The South Carolina rule does not even require the judge to apply a proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in ruling on
a motion for acquittal. "This means . . . that a man may be jailed or put to death,
although the trial judge and the upper court are clearly convinced that the man's guilt
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Castro, 228 F.2d 807,
808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
See also United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971), where the Court stated that "a
court should always set aside a jury verdict of guilt when there is not enough evidence
from which a jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 72
n.7.
44. "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." In re
Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
45. See State v. Stuart, 51 Haw. 656, 466 P.2d 444 (1970) (Levinson, J., concurring).
46. Id. at..._, 466 P.2d at 449 (citing Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance
of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1161-62 (1960); Note, The Motion
for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151 (1961)).
It should be noted that United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972), brought
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II. COMPETENCY OF A WITNESS-AGE AND BELIEF IN GOD
In State v. Green 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court clari-
fied the present law in South Carolina concerning the competency
of a child to offer testimony as a witness in a trial. Moreover, the
court finally settled the issue of whether a trial judge is required
to question a witness about his belief in God or His providence
in order to test the witness's competency to give truthful testi-
mony.
The facts of Green are relatively simple. Anthony "Pop"
Green was tried and convicted for the murder of Aurelia Sumter.
At the trial, the judge permitted six year old Tommy Sumter, the
brother of the victim, to testify about the murder. When the state
offered the child as a witness, and the only known eyewitness,
counsel for the defendant objected on the ground that Tommy
was too young to respond competently to the questions asked of
him. Thereafter, the trial judge held a hearing, out of the pres-
ence of the jury, to determine the child's competency to testify.
The court extensively questioned the child to determine whether
he could understand the questions asked of him and whether he
could adequately communicate information in response to the
questions. Satisfied that Tommy was in fact competent, the court
proceeded to allow him to testify to the jury.
On appeal, the appellant-defendant maintained that the
trial judge abused his judicial discretion in allowing the child to
testify. 8 The appellant raised two main objections concerning the
witness's competency: (1) The witness could not adequately re-
late his observations concerning his sister's death in a coherent
way to the jury, i.e., he did not exhibit an understanding of the
questions asked of him; he did not specify what he had seen; and
he could only answer questions which suggested the desired an-
swers to him; and (2) the trial judge failed to inquire whether
Tommy believed in God and whether he feared punishment if he
in considering motions for acquittal. Presently, all of the circuits apply the strict proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as expressed in the Curley test (see note 38 supra).
Comment, 51 N.C.L. REv. at 891-94, note 39 supra.
47. -. S.C., 230 S.E.2d 618 (1976).
48. Appellant also argued, unsuccessfully, that the evidence presented by the state
was insufficient to support the verdict of guilty on the murder charge. If the supreme court
had found that Tommy Sumter's testimony should have been excluded on the basis of
incompetency, then the court may have determined that the evidence was in fact insuffi-
cient. However, since the court found that Tommy was competent, the charge that the
evidence was insufficient never evolved into a serious challenge.
1977]
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were to lie. 9
In answer to the appellant's allegation of the child's incom-
petency based on his age, the court found: "The mere fact that
Tommy was but a six year old boy at the time of the trial did not
in itself make him incompetent to testify. There is no fixed age
which an individual must attain in order to be competent to
testify as a witness.""0 Additionally, the court noted that the
decision of whether a witness is competent is one which the trial
court judge must make' and, once made, is one which is custom-
arily treated with great deference by appellate courts. The court
further explained that the "determination will not be reversed
unless a clear showing of abuse of discretion can be made." '52
After finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining that Tommy was generally competent to testify,
the court then addressed the appellant's charge that the trial
court erred by failing to examine the witness as to his belief in
God. 3 The court clearly found:
We hold that it is not required of a trial judge to ask ques-
tions respecting a belief in God or His providence. As long as the
challenged witness answers that he knows the difference be-
tween right and wrong, that it is right to tell the truth and wrong
to lie, that he will tell the truth if permitted to testify, and that
he fears being punished if he does lie, even if that fear is moti-
vated solely by the perjury statute, he satisfies the requirement
regarding "moral accountability." 4
49. -S.C. at._, 230 S.E.2d at 619.
50. Id. (citing Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895) (where a five and one-
half year old child was permitted to testify); Pecatelle v. United States, 394 F.2d 115 (9th
Cir. 1968) (where witnesses of five and seven years of age testified); Webster v. Peyton,
294 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Va. 1968) (where an eight year old was allowed to testify)).
Dean McCormick states the following rule regarding the age of a witness as it relates
to the question of competency: "There is no rule which excludes . . . a child of any
specified age, from testifying, but in each case the traditional test is whether the witness
has intelligence enough to make it worthwhile to hear him at all and whether he feels a
duty to tell the truth." C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 62, at 140 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK] (footnotes omitted).
See also 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 478 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]
(The general competency of a witness depends on an ability to observe, recollect, and
communicate; there is no specific age requirement).
51. - S.C. at_, 230 S.E.2d at 619. Accord, 2 WIGMORE § 487.
52. - S.C. at., 230 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Peyton v. Strickland, 262 S.C. 210,
203 S.E.2d 388 (1974); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 58 (1957)).
53. For a general discussion of the South Carolina law prior to Green, concerning the
required belief in God for a witness to be deemed competent to testify, see Note, The
Requirement of a Religious Belief for Competency of a Witness, 11 S.C.L.Q. 518 (1959).
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The court, however, did not merely settle the question of
whether a trial judge is required to ask a witness if he believes in
God; it took a further step and decided that "it is not essential
that a challenged witness state a belief in God or His providence
before being allowed to testify."55 In the former situation the
judge is relieved from examining the witness as to a belief in God.
In the latter situation, even if the judge does undertake an exami-
nation into the witness's belief in God, the witness does not have
to state such a belief in order to be found competent. It is only
required that the witness know the difference between "right and
wrong and the probability of punishment for lying."5
The court distinguished Green from an earlier decision, State
v. Hicks.57 In Hicks the court held that "despite the declaration
of a codefendant testifying for the State that he was agnostic, he
was nonetheless competent to testify.""5 The Hicks case was the
55. Id.
56. Id. The court quoted with approval the following passage from C.J.S., which is
apparently the basis for its holding:
At common law, one who did not believe in the existence of a Supreme
Being and consequently was under no apprehension of future punishment for his
falsehood was incompetent to testify, but the constitutions or laws of most
American states, if not all, have abolished religious tests as to the competency
of witnesses, and it is now generally held that religious belief is not a test of the
competency of a witness. A belief in the inspired character of the Bible is not
essential.
Id. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 620-21 (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 62 (1947) (emphasis added
by the court)).
See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-40 (1976), which permits a witness to attest, by
either oath or affirmation, that he will tell the truth. This section provides:
Any witness or party to any proceeding, in any and all courts of this State,
may make solemn and conscientious affirmation and declaration, according to
the form of his religious belief or profession, as to any matter or thing whereof
an oath is required. Such affirmation and declaration shall be held as valid and
effectual as if such person had taken an oath on the Holy Evangelists.
Id.
On the subject of requiring oaths, one commentator has noted that some "courts deem
to regard the requirement of understanding the nature and obligation of an oath as in-
tended not to inject a religious requirement, but to require that each witness recognize
some moral obligation to speak the truth." Weihofen, Testimonial Competence and
Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 53, 57-58 (1965) (footnote omitted).
57. 257 S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971).
58. State v. Green, -. S.C. at - , 230 S.E.2d at 620 (citing State v. Hicks, 257
S.C. 279, 185 S.E.2d 746 (1971)). See also State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 182 S.E.2d 738
(1971), where the court affirmed a trial court's decision to permit an admitted agnostic
to testify because "[tihe question of [thel competency of a witness is a question for the
court, and . .. it is the duty of the court to determine that question upon a careful
examination of the witness as to age, capacity, and moral and legal accountability." Id.
at 430, 182 S.E.2d at 743 (quoting State v. Comstock, 137 W. Va. 152, 176, 70 S.E.2d 648,
661 (1952)).
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last case, prior to Green, that dealt specifically with the issue of
whether a witness must state a belief in God to be declared com-
petent to testify. The Hicks decision was largely based on the fact
that the witness had stated that he respected the idea of God, was
aware of the perjury law, and was conscious of the fact that if he
did not tell the full truth that he would be punished, here, if not
hereafter. . 5
It is evident that Green, as contrasted with Hicks, takes a
more liberal view of the common law requirement that one must
believe in God to be a competent witness. Under the Green deci-
sion, not only is an agnostic competent to testify, but an atheist
is also allowed to be a witness, provided that the witness attest
to the fact that he will tell the truth and that he exhibits an
understanding of right from wrong. There is no firm rule that one
must believe in God or His providence to be considered a compe-
tent witness.60
In Green there was yet another issue raised by the appellant
in regard to the examination of the child to test his competency
as a witness. In his brief, the appellant noted that in order to test
the young witness's competency, the trial judge unduly led the
witness and "an answer had to be suggested before a definite
answer to the question was given." 6' Therefore, the questions
asked by the judge should be found to be improper, and the
answers which were thereby elicited should be excluded from the
evidence. The appellant cited the following passage from the re-
cord in support of his contention that the witness's answers were
unfairly attained:
The Court: Have you ever been to Sunday School?
Master Sumter: (He nods yes).
The Court: You have been to Sunday School. What do they
teach you in Sunday School? You don't know what they teach
you in Sunday School?
Master Sumter: (He nods yes).
The Court: You do know?
Master Sumter: (He nods yes).
The Court: What do they teach you in Sunday School?
59. 257 S.C. 279, 279-80, 185 S.E.2d 746, 746 (1971).
60. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
61. Brief for Appellant at 9, State v. Green, - S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 618 (1976).
For the general rule in South Carolina regarding leading questions and related judicial
discretion, see State v. Hughey, 214 S.C. 111, 51 S.E.2d 376 (1949); State v. Cook, 204
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Master Sumter: Same
The Court: The same? They teach you the same. Do they ever
teach you in Sunday School that you are suppose [sic] to be a
good boy? Do they teach you that?
Master Sumter: (He nods yes). 2
In view of the preceding passage, the questions asked by the
trial judge do indeed appear to be highly suggestive of the desired
answers. However, considering the fact that the judge was exam-
ining a young child, who was probably frightened, the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion by asking the particular questions in
the manner that he did. Dean McCormick states that in question-
ing a child witness it is usually necessary to ask leading questions,
and the judge must be able to exercise wide discretion in such
matters: "It is recognized, especially as to children, that in those
cases the danger of false suggestion is at its highest, but it is
better to face that danger than to abandon altogether the effort
to bring out what the witness knows." 3
Under the facts and circumstances of the Green case, it ap-
pears that the trial judge effectively questioned Tommy Sumter
to ascertain whether the child should have been allowed to tes-
tify. Furthermore, the record fully supports the judge's ultimate
decision in finding the witness to be competent. It is evident that
the child knew the difference between right and wrong and that
he could answer and understand the questions asked of him rea-
sonably well. The decision of the judge to allow the child to testify
was further necessitated since Tommy was the only eyewitness to
the homicide. It was the jury's duty to determine later the credi-
bility and weight to be given to such testimony once it was admit-
ted into evidence.
In State v. Green the court has effectively adopted a more
liberal and rational view of the common law requirement that
only an affirmed believer in God should be declared competent
as a witness. The better and more reasonable approach to the
issue of witness competency is the rule which has been espoused
by the court: if a witness knows that it is right to tell the truth
and if he attests to the fact that he will tell the truth, then the
mere fact that he does not believe in God or His providence
should not prevent him from testifying as a witness.
Carl H. Jacobson
62. Brief for Appellant at 8-9 (quoting Record at 68-69).
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